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Summary 
The increase in risk prevention investments in the port-hinterland service network (PHSN) 
effectively enhances the network’s ability to resist risks and improve the sustainability and 
stability of ocean transportation. Based on the construction of the PHSN risk prevention 
investment utility model, the equilibrium strategy, the related characteristics of each 
participant in the complementary networks and the complete network are analyzed. Similarly, 
the subsidy policy of the government under the utility maximization of the whole service 
network is studied. We further propose new types of subsidy strategies based on the key 
nodes and key groups given the resources available and the subsidy efficiency constraints 
imposed, while also validating the advantages of this method based on a case analysis. The 
results indicate that the (1) equilibrium risk prevention investment is closely related to the 
Katz-Bonacich centrality, network interaction intensity, cost of unit risk prevention 
investment and competition intensity; (2) an undifferentiated subsidy strategy cannot improve 
the risk prevention effectiveness of the whole network; (3) the subsidy strategy based on key 
nodes and key groups effectively improves the risk prevention efficiency; and (4) the subsidy 
strategy of key groups is superior to the subsidy strategy of key nodes. Accordingly, the 
results of this study provide a reference for participants and managers in the PHSN when 
making risk prevention investment decisions. 
Key words: port-hinterland service network; risk prevention; network game; subsidy 
policy 
1. Introduction 
The port-hinterland service network (PHSN) is the link between the ports and the 
hinterlands, and as such, it is an important part of the entire ocean transportation process. In 
recent years, risk factors such as natural disasters, strikes, terrorist attacks, improper personnel 
operations, and epidemics have seriously affected the security of the PHSN [1,2]. For 
example, the outbreak of COVID-19 in 2020 impacted, to a certain degree, the global 
shipping and logistics industry [3], as is shown is Fig. 1, and other types of risk event are 
Zhang Pengfei, Han Bing Risk transmission and control of port-hinterland service network: 
Kuang Haibo from the perspective of preventive investment and government subsidies 
60 
listed in Table 1. The ability of the PHSN to resist risk is directly related to the sustainability 
and stability of the import and export cargo transportation between the ports and the 
hinterlands. Therefore, while it is necessary to improve the ability of the participants and the 
entire transport network to prevent risk by increasing the corresponding investments before 
the risk occurs, doing so proves to be a great challenge for both the participants and the 
managers in the PHSN. 
 
 
Fig. 1 Impacts of COVID-19 on world volume of exports and imports  
Source: UNCTAD (2020). 
 
Table 1 Representative risk event related with PHSNs 




2011.3, Earthquake of the 
Pacific coast of Tōhoku, 
Japan 
All ports in the northeastern part of Japan and the surrounding 
hinterland facilities were closed. Seven percent of Japan's 
containers were damaged or backlogged.  
2005，Hurricane Katrina, 
America 
USD1.7 billion damages to the Louisiana port and estimated USD 
882 million losses of agricultural trade. 
Explosions 
2015.8.12, Tianjin port 
explosion, China 
165 people were killed, 798 were injured. 304buildings, 12428 cars 
and 7533 containers were destroyed or damaged. The direct 
economic loss was RMB 6.8 billion.  
2020.8.4，Beirut port 
explosion, Lebanon 
137 people were killed, 5000 were injured. The economic loss was 
more than USD 3 billion 
Strikes 
2002, Port strike on US 
west coast, America 
Ten terminals in the Port of Los Angeles and Long Beach were 
affected. The two ports were suspended for 5 days, and the daily 
economic loss was as high as USD 1 billion.  
2017, Spanish port strikes, 
Spain 
A large number of ships were diverted and cargo transshipped, and 
Maersk’s losses caused by this amounted to more than EUR12 
million. 
Source: Summarized by the authors from various sources. 
 
The PHSN is composed primarily of ports, intermediate carriers, and nodes in the 
hinterlands. In recent years, many scholars have discussed the competition and cooperation 
relationships among the participants of the transportation service network from the 
perspective of supply chain management. The research issues involve service pricing[4], 
strategy selection under demand, price and other uncertainties[5,6], contract formulation 
based on benefit maximization and an alliance strategy to enhance competitiveness[7,8]. 
However, risk, as an important factor affecting the stability of the transportation service 
network, is not fully considered. In the existing research, the risks faced by the transportation 
service network are reflected primarily in the identification of risk factors during the service 
process and participants interactions with respect to risk factors and risk assessment[9-13]. In 
addition, focusing on the uncertainty of demand, supply, price, and natural conditions in the 
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transportation service network and on the interruption of service nodes, many scholars use 
stochastic programming, scenario analyses, robust optimization, and other methods to 
construct optimal single objective and multi-objective models based on revenue, quantity of 
goods, costs, transportation time and other factors[14-17] to improve the stability and 
efficiency of the transportation service network. 
To sum up, scholars have conducted in-depth studies of the game relationship among 
participants, risk factor identification, and model design in transportation service networks, 
thus providing theoretical and technical support for solving the problems in the PHSN. 
However, the existing research is concerned primarily with (1) transportation service 
problems and the solutions to problems that follow the occurrence of risks in the supply chain, 
(2) a lack of consideration regarding network utility between agents in the transportation 
service network and (3) the adoption of precautionary measures for risks. Accordingly, this 
paper constructs the PHSN risk prevention investment utility model, analyzes the participants' 
risk prevention investment utilities and strategies from the perspective of managers and 
operators in the PHSN, studies the optimal subsidy strategy under a whole network utility 
maximization scenario, proposes the subsidy strategy based on the identification of key nodes 
and key groups for resource and efficiency constraints, and validates the model and method 
via a case analysis. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the related literature. In 
Section 3, we construct the risk prevention investment utility function and analyze the 
equilibrium strategy and other characteristics in complementary and complete PHSNs. To 
investigate the subsidy policy of government in improving the risk prevention utility, two 
types of subsidy policies are presented in Section 4. In Section 5, we further put forward the 
key node and key group subsidy methods to enhance subsidy utility and efficiency. A case 
study validates this model in Section 6, and conclusions are presented in Section 7. 
2. Literature Review 
Here we will briefly discuss previous research that has focused on port investment 
under uncertainties and risk prevention, and network game studies.  
(1) Port investment with uncertainties 
Substantial research on port investments has been conducted, including studies on port 
capacity, price, route, and scale, under a variety of situations, such as regional competition, 
alliances, monopolies and shared hinterlands[18-22]. As uncertainty is an important risk 
factor that affects the stable operation of ports and transportation networks, it has gradually 
become the focus of scholarly research. The uncertain factors considered mainly include time, 
port capacity, market demand and information asymmetry. For example, Matteo Balliauw 
studied the problems of the time and scale of capacity investments for port managers and port 
operators in the face of congestion and uncertainty. The results reveal that a high proportion 
of public participation prompts early large-scale investments, that the amount of investment 
will increase with the increase of cost and uncertainty and that the investment time will 
simultaneously be delayed[23]. Ali Asadabadi combines stochastic programming, two-level 
programming and game theory to consider the optimal investment strategy of uncertain ports, 
such as time and port capacity under competitive and cooperative circumstances, to improve 
the stability and flexibility of ports[24]. Hsiao-chi Chen built a two-stage game model and 
analyzed the port capacity investment strategy of risk-averse ports in the face of port 
congestion and market uncertainty[25]. Xiaofan Lai takes into account information sharing 
between ports and shipping enterprises as well as the risk preferences of shipping enterprises 
in studies about the investment strategies of sustainable emissions reduction using a two-stage 
game model. The results indicate that sustainable emissions reduction investment is positively 
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correlated with port service price and negatively correlated with freight[6]. These studies 
serve as references as ports deal with the problems of uncertainty. 
(2) Risk prevention 
In recent years, terrorist attacks, natural disasters, hazardous chemical explosions, and 
other such major issues have seriously affected ports and their related service networks. 
Hence, as the problem of risk response has attracted the attention of scholars, the existing 
literature has focused on the responses to related risk problems, including risk response and 
prevention. Risk response is reflected primarily in the allocation and scheduling of related 
resources, route planning, and timing selection after the risk occurs[26-28]. The prevention of 
risk involves reducing the probability of risks and enhancing the ability to resist risks by 
increasing investments in risk prevention. Accordingly, scholars conducted an in-depth 
analysis of the scale, timing, and strategy of risk prevention investments based on the 
characteristics of the ports’ attributes, backgrounds, risk occurrence probability, and related 
constraints. For example, Nan Liu studied the risk prevention investment strategies of two 
adjacent ports under four scenarios, and the results indicated that when two ports are 
complementary, the risk prevention investments of the two ports in cooperation are higher 
than the risk prevention investments of two ports in competition[29]. Using the landlord port 
as the research agent, Xiao proposed a comprehensive risk prevention investment model 
under the premise of considering the probability of risk occurrence and the rate of return on 
investment. The research found that the investment time and the probability of risk occurrence 
are positively correlated. However, if the supervisor does not have sufficient knowledge of 
the risk probability, his intervention often does not produce the desired effect[30]. Liuquan 
Gong built a stylized analytical model to examine the managerial and policy implications of 
interactions between the two counteracting mechanisms. The results indicate that while port 
managers always prioritize capacity investment over natural disaster prevention investment, 
social welfare maximizing ports invest more in both capacity and disaster prevention than 
profit maximizing operators[31].In addition, Yi-bin Xiao proposed a comprehensive 
economic model to study coastal and marine disaster prevention investment and analyze the 
relationships between investment timing and investment amount and disaster occurrence 
probability and return in terms of prevention investment for marine disasters and climate 
change[32]. Laingo M. Randrianarisoa used two host ports as research objects and examined 
the optimal investment scale and investment time of ports when coping with climate 
change[33]. 
(3) Network game  
Another aspect involved in our research is the network game. Ballester conducted a 
comprehensive analysis in 2006 that provided theoretical support for the following studies. 
Under the noncooperative game, he conducted an in-depth study of the optimal consumption 
amount, welfare utility, network conversion and importance of the participants in the 
consumption network[34]. Subsequently, relevant studies gradually appeared in various 
fields. For example, Michael D. König analyzed the Nash equilibrium strategy of complete 
competition among multiple enterprises in multiple markets in the R&D network and 
investigated the effectiveness of the strategy and the relationship between subsidy strategy 
and network structure[35]. Robert W. Helsley analyzed the interaction strategies and 
settlement strategies of individuals in social networks while considering the network 
interaction utility[36]. Coralio Ballester studied the relationship between individual efforts 
and utility in criminal networks, and proposed relevant measures to reduce cybercrime, such 
as increasing investment in crime prevention, finding key criminal members and important 
criminal groups[37]. Based on the research of network Nash equilibrium and Bonacich 
centrality, Claudio J. Tessone puts forward a dynamic network generation mechanism based 
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on individual centrality and analyzed the nesting phenomenon during the process of network 
convergence through examples[38]. These studies mainly focus on the Nash equilibrium state 
analysis in different kinds of network and the external effects of network utility, which 
provide the basic method and analysis perspective for our study. 
(4) Research gaps  
As pointed in the previous studies, little research is available about PHSN risk 
prevention and lacks the risk prevention equilibrium strategy analysis for each participant 
from network perspective. The government as the key risk manager whose subsidy policy has 
great impacts on the risk prevention results. However, the current studies only discuss 
whether the subsidy is useful, ignoring the effect of different subsidy strategy on risk 
prevention. The subsidy strategy made considering the risk prevention utility of the whole 
service network is also unsolved.  
Therefore, to solve these abovementioned problems, this paper concentrates on the risk 
prevention of PHSNs from the perspective of investment and government’s subsidy strategy 
by using the network game theory and some characteristics of the complex network theory, 
with the intent to provide insights for managers and operators in risk prevention under the 
limitation of resource and time. 
3. Model Construction and Solution 
The PHSN is composed of ports, carriers and nodes in hinterlands, such as hubs, 
logistics parks, and distribution centers, all of which play an important role in importing and 
exporting cargos. As displayed in Fig. 2, when cargos are transported from the hinterland to 
the port via carriers, various groups cooperate with each other to complete the transport 
process, even though there are competitive and cooperative relationships within the same 
groups. Participants in the same group may cooperate with each other to achieve a win-win 
situation in response to the threat of risk, such as natural disasters, strikes, terrorist attacks, 
improper personnel operations, and epidemics, while competing in price, service and 
hinterland. Therefore, the port-hinterland service network is a complete network in which 
competition and cooperation coexist. Since some properties and characteristics of complete 
networks are similar to those of complementary networks, this paper begins with 










Relations in the same group Relations between different groups
Nodes in hinterlands Carrires Ports
 
Fig. 2 Port-hinterland service network schematic diagram 
3.1 Model construction and solution under a complementary network 
In this study, we assume that the enterprise can improve its risk prevention ability by 
increasing its relative investment. The total risk prevention utility function of each node in the 
PHSN ( , , )i i iu v v g−  consists of two parts. The first part is i i i iy d v= − , where i  represents 
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the revenue; id  is the cost of per unit investment, which has positive correlation with the 
enterprise service ability or scale; iv  denotes the risk prevention investment volume of 
participant i ; and iv−  is the risk prevention investment volume without participant i . In this 
way, the unlimited risk prevention investments of enterprises can be avoided. In the second 
part, which is the utility function of risk prevention investment, we assume diminishing 
returns for risk prevention utility, i.e., the next dollar invested would produce a smaller utility 
than the last dollar produced. This assumption is widely used in utility theory and it controls 
the situation of unlimited investment, which guarantees the practical meaning of this model. 
In the existing literatures, the linear quadratic function is widely used to consider network 
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Taking i id = −  and substituting it into the arrangement, the utility function is 
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Among them, 0i  , ijg  is the relationship between participants i  and j , 
and (0,1)ijg   represents the cooperative relations between participants i  and j , where 
higher values indicate more intense cooperation; ( 1,0)ijg  −  represents the competitive 
relations between participants i  and j , where the smaller values indicate greater competition; 
and   is the interaction strength between participants i  and j , which reflects their 














































，then ( , , )i i iu v v g−  is a convex function. 













if 0ijg  , then iv  and jv  are complementary, the risk prevention utility of participant i  will 
grow with the increasing risk prevention investment of participant j  by network 
complementarity. However, if 0ijg  , there exists competition between iv  and jv , and thus, 
when participant j ’s risk prevention utility increases, the risk prevention investment will 
have a negative impact on participant i 's risk prevention investment utility. 
Before solving the model, the Katz–Bonacich centrality of network is introduced. This 
network indicator is proposed by Katz and Bonacich[39], which has proven to be extremely 
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useful in game theoretic applications. kG  is the k the power of matrix G , k  is the number of 
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= , count the number of walks of all lengths from  i  
to j  in the network g ,   is the decay parameter that scales down the relative weight of 
longer walks. Note that, when M  is well-defined, one can write − =M GM I  and hence 
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which is equal to the sum of the elements of the i th row of M . Its matrix form is 
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 = −1 1b I G , 1  is the 1n  dimensional vector of ones. When the weight is 
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The matrix form is: 
  
 1
1(g, ) M = [ ]n 
−
 = −1b I G    (6) 
Where   is a n-dimensional vector. 
The first-order condition for a maximum of (3) with respect to iv  gives the best-
response function * *
1
n
i i ij j
j
v g v 
=
= +  , The matrix form is 
* *= +v Gv , it equals 
* 1[ ]- −=v I G  , because 1[ ] −= −M I G , so it can be rewrite to * =v M . The expanded 
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= =  , where i id = − .  
We next provide the proof for the unique Nash equilibrium. Observe that this game is a 
potential game which is constructed by taking the sum of all utilities and corrected by a term 
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Its matrix form is: 
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   = −1 1p v v v + v Gv = v v I G v   (8) 
The Hessian matrix of (7) is easily computed to be ( )− −I G . The matrix ( )−I G  is 
positive definite if for all no-zero v  by definition, so if ( - )











. By the Rayleigh-Ritz theorem, we have ( ) 1G  , ( ) G  is the spectral radius 
of the matrix G . Thus, the necessary and sufficient condition for having a unique interior 
Nash equilibrium is ( ) 1 G . 
Therefore, the following conclusions can be drawn from the analysis: 
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(1) If ( ) 1 G , there exists a unique interior Nash equilibrium. At this point, the 
investment of agent i  in risk prevention is equal to its weighted Katz-Bonacich centrality, 
namely, *( ) ( )
ii i
v x , ,g b g,θ=-ix . Because of the complementary effect of the network, the 
increase in risk prevention investment of other agents has a positive impact on risk prevention 
utility. 
(2) If ( ) 1 G , *( )i iv x , ,g-ix  grows as the intensity of the network interaction intensity 
coefficient   increases. Since i id = − , 
*( )i iv x , ,g-ix  decreases with the increase in the unit 
cost of risk prevention investment id . 
* *
1 1





V g v x , ,g b g,θ
= =
= = -ix  represents the total amount of risk prevention 
investment under the equilibrium state of the PHSN. Assuming that network g  is a nested 
network in network g , i.e., the density of network g  is greater than the density of network 
g , then 
* *( ) ( )V g V g   due to the complementary effect of the network. Thus, it can be 
concluded that 
(3) For a sufficiently small  , the total amount of the PHSN risk prevention investment 
in the equilibrium condition increases as the density of the network increases. 
3.2 Complete Network Characteristics Analysis 
In reality, the PHSN is composed of cooperative relationships and competitive 
relationships, i.e., it is a complete network. Let the matrix [ ]ij =  represent a complete 
network. According to Ballester's research[34], any complete network can be decomposed 
into: 
 I U G   = − − +   (9) 
where I  denotes the n-square identity matrix; U denotes the n-square matrix of ones; 
[ ]ijG g=  is a zero-diagonal nonnegative square matrix, interpreted as the adjacency matrix of 
the network g ; and ( ) /ij ijg   = + ，  = + ， min{ ,0} = − ， min{ | }ij i j = ≠ ，
max{ | }ij i j = ≠ ，  = − − ， min{ ,0}  . Because 0iig = , a complete network can 

































  (10) 
According to the above analysis, the optimal risk prevention investment of each 
participant in the complementary network is 1
1(g, ) M = [ ]n 
−
 = −1b I G  , where   is the 
n-dimensional vector. If we transform the complete network G  into a complementary 








= −1b I G    (11) 
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Thus, conclusion (4) states that that when   remains unchanged, the optimal risk 
prevention investment of each participant is positively correlated with the maximum 
competitive intensity in the PHSN. Other properties of the complete PHSN are the same as 
those of the complementary network in conclusions (1), (2) and (3). 
4. The subsidy strategy under overall utility maximization 
If the manager and operator of the PHSN adopt corresponding subsidy strategies, doing 
so can spur the PHSN participants to prevent risks and promote the ability of risk prevention 
for the whole network to some extent. From a macro perspective, subsidy strategies can be 
divided into homogeneous and targeted subsidies.  
4.1 Homogeneous risk prevention investment subsidy 
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The total risk prevention investment utility of the PHSN is: 
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 . Accordingly, it is evident that taking the homogeneous risk prevention 
investment subsidy cannot improve the total utility of the network. 
4.2 Targeted risk prevention investment subsidy 
When taking the targeted risk prevention investment subsidy, we assume that the 
subsidy for each unit of risk prevention investment is is  and that the utility function after the 
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Thus, the risk prevention investment utility of the entire PHSN is: 
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=  . Accordingly, it is concluded that the managers and operators of the PHSN can 
improve the risk resistance ability of the entire service network by adopting targeted subsidies 
for all participants within the resource constraint. 
5. Risk prevention investment subsidy strategy under resource and efficiency 
constraints 
Although a targeted subsidy strategy for all participants can improve the total utility of 
the entire PHSN, this approach is restricted under resource and efficiency constraints. 
Therefore, to improve the utility and efficiency of resources, the importance of the 
participants in the PHSN is evaluated to determine the key nodes and groups and to 
implement a targeted risk prevention investment subsidy to exploit the best uses of the 
resources. Herein, we describe the method applied to identify the key nodes and then explain 
the method employed to find the key groups. 
5.1 Risk prevention investment subsidies based on key nodes 
Based on the previously discussed analysis, the optimal equilibrium investment of each 




i i ij j
j
v g v 
=
 = +  , and the equilibrium 
aggregate risk prevention investment is ( ) Tv g,θ = 1 v , when assuming that the manager or 
operator of this PHSN can eliminate participant i  from network g . By eliminating participant 
i , the original service network changes its shape as all the direct links in g  stemming from i  
also disappear.  ig −  represents the resulting network and ( , )iv g −  denotes the resulting 
overall risk prevention investment in equilibrium state. The problem with identifying the key 
nodes is that when this service network achieves the maximum utility after removing 
participant i , the aggregate amount of the equilibrium risk prevention investment only 
reaches the minimum amount, specifically: 
    max ( , ) ( , ) | 1,..., ,min ( , ) | 1,...,i iv g v g i n v g i = n  − −− =   (17) 
Because 1[ ]- 2 − =v I G  , the problem is further converted by solving 
 1min ( , ) | 1,...,i ng i = n− b . 
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centrality of node i  is equal to the difference of node i ’s centrality in g  and in 
jg − , where 
node j  has been removed. Finally, the inter-centrality is written as follows: 
 
1,




g b g b g   
= 
= +    (18) 
The interaction centrality consists of two parts. The first part is the centrality of node i , 
and the second part is the contribution of node i  to the centrality of every other node. From 
this, it is concluded that when *( , ) ( , )i ig g    , 1,...,i n=  where node i  is the key node. 
The following is a comparison between a random node subsidy stratify and the key 
node subsidy strategy. Because ( , ) ( , ) ( , )
i
ji j jb g b g b g  
−= − , then 
( , ) ( , ) ( , )ij j jib g b g b g  




( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , )




j j i j j i j j i
n
j i i i
j j i
b g b g b g b g
b g g b g b g g
   
      
− −
=  =  = 
= 
= = −
= − + = −
  

  (19) 
Substituting (17) into the following equation yields the following: 
 
1 1
( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , )( , ) ( , )
( , ) 1
( , )







b g b g g gv g v g
g n n
g
v g v g b g b g g
      
 
 





= = = 
− − + 
  (20) 
Hence, it is clear that the key node subsidy is superior to the random node subsidy. 
5.2 Risk prevention investment subsidies based on key groups 
In the case of limited risk prevention resources, key node subsidy and key group 
subsidy can also be taken. Based on the concept of finding the key nodes, we characterize the 
method of searching for key groups. This problem can be transformed into the following: 
    max ( , ) ( , ) | , ,min ( , ) | ,S Sv g v g S N S s b g S N S s  − −−  =  =   (21) 
(1) When 1s = , calculate the minimum value of ( , ) ( , ) ( , )i ib g b g g   
− = −  to 
determine the maximum value of ( , )i g  . 
(2) When 2s  , determine the minimum value of the following formula: 
 1 2 11 1 2
1 2 3
,...,
( , ) ( , ) ( ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ,..., ( , ))s
s
i i ii i iS
i i i ib g b g g g g g         
−− − − −− − −− = − + + + +   (22) 
This is equivalent to: 
  1 2 11 1 2
1 2 3
,...,
1 2max ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ,..., ( , ) | , ,...,
s
s
i i ii i i
i i i i sg g g g i i i N       
−− − − −− − −+ + + +    (23) 
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Then, set , ,( , ) ( , ),
k k
i S i S
k S
b g b g i S  

=  , which reflects the contribution of group S  to the 
centrality of any participant outside the set S . , ( , )
k
i Sb g   calculates the number of paths for 
length k  starting from i  and passing through all nodes in S  at least once. 
 , ,
1
( , ) ( , )
k
k p k p
i S ij j S j
j S p
b g g b g −
−
 =
= , when S =  the result is , ( , ) ( , )i ib g b g  = . 
  ,, \
( , ) ( , ) ( , )S i Si S i
i S i S
g b g b g   
 
= +   adds up the walks stemming from nodes outside the 
set and those starting from nodes inside the set. When focusing on singletons, we 
get ( , ) ( , )i ig g   = . Therefore, the inter-centrality of group S  is as follows: 
(1) When 1S = , the group inter-centrality equals the inter-centrality ( , )i g  . 
(2) When 1S  , the inter-centrality of group S is: 
 1 2 11 1 2
1 2 3
,...,
( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ,..., ( , )s
s
i i ii i i
S i i i ig g g g        
−− − − −− − −= + + + +   (24) 
Therefore, if *S  is a group with the highest group inter-centrality, group *S  is the key 
group, i.e., * arg  max{ ( , ) , s}SS g S N S   = ，1 1s n  − . 
 
6. Case Analysis 
This study analyzes the agents’ risk prevention investment strategy and its 
characteristics from the network perspective and advances several subsidy strategies. We 
select a PHSN in northeast China as an example to illustrate the results. Consider a PHSN 
with 35 cities as nodes in the hinterland, 85 registered logistics enterprises as carriers and 6 
ports in the provinces of Liaoning, Jilin and Heilongjiang. The port group consists of Dalian 
Port, Dandong Port, Yingkou Port, Panjin Port, Jinzhou Port and Huludao Port. The relevant 
data of the ports, carriers and nodes in hinterlands from 2020 are retrieved from the Yearbook 
Ports of China, China Logistics Yearbook, and Northeastern China Statistical Yearbook. As 
the PHSN is a complete network that consists of cooperative and competitive relations 
between each node, we use a multinomial logit model and gravity model to compute the 
cooperative and competitive relations, respectively. A multinomial logit model is used to 
describe the choice probability between two agents. Its basic expression is 
1
exp( ) 1















, where v  denotes the utility of each agent, b is a 
constant above zero, and the gravity model is used to compute the volumes of goods between 









= , where ip  and jp  represent the export volume 
of goods between the two places and 
ijd  is the distance between the two places. To simplify 
the model, let 1 = . The indicators considered in computing the cooperative relations 
between nodes in the hinterland and the carriers are registered capital, number of employees, 
number of years since the establishment of the company, ownership of company, i.e., person, 
other company or country, the distance between the carrier and the port, and the distance to 
the carrier. Because the choice probabilities of nodes in the hinterland can affect the carriers’ 
choice probabilities, the relations between carriers and ports are the product of the choice 
probability between nodes in the hinterlands and that between carriers and ports. For the 
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choice probabilities between nodes in the hinterlands and port and that between carriers and 
ports, indicators include such factors as distance, the number of berth, port throughput, 
average ship loading and uploading capacity per hour, average drawbridge loading and 
uploading capacity per hour, number of arrived ships, and average number days of containers 
are delayed in the yard. Because Dalian Port and Yingkou Port belong to the Liaoning Port 
Group, the relations between them are calculated using the multinomial logit model. Finally, 
to reduce the volatility of the data analysis, we standardize the data, a 126 126  matrix of a 
PHSN is obtained, as presented in Fig. 3 and Table 2. 
 
 
Fig. 3 The PHSN of three provinces in northeast China 
 
Table 2 Statistical table of the nodes in the PHSN 
Ports 
Dalian Port, Yingkou Port, Dandong Port, Jinzhou Port, 
Huludao Port, Panjin Port 
6 
Carriers 
CRCT, China materials storage and transportation group、








 (1) The validation of the conclusions in Section 3. The maximum eigenvalue of the 
network is 77.723. Since the existence condition of the equilibrium solution is ( ) 1 G , 
then 0.01287  . We set  =0.012 in the following analysis without special instructions. 
Using ports as an example, their equilibrium risk prevention investment, which is presented in 
Table 3, has a value that is equal to the port's weighted Katz-Bonacich centrality. It is further 
evident that as   increases in value, the equilibrium risk prevention investment of the port 
increases and decreases as the unit investment cost increases. In addition, the aggregate risk 
prevention investment in the equilibrium state is 3533.406, and the number of network 
participants is 126. After eliminating half of the participants, the aggregate risk prevention 
investment in the equilibrium state is 2372.328, which indicates that the overall risk 
prevention investment in the equilibrium state is positively correlated with network density. 
These results are consistent with the conclusions in Section 3. 
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Table 3 The equilibrium risk prevention investment of ports 
Port  =0.008  =0.012  =0.012， id   
Dalian Port 5.013 34.693 18.231 
Dandong Port 5.777 34.507 18.251 
Yingkou Port 5.467 33.840 17.920 
Panjin Port 5.912 34.863 18.431 
Jinzhou Port 5.874 34.901 18.451 
Huludao Port 5.463 31.134 16.532 
 
Table 4 illustrates the port risk prevention investment subsidy at different   values with 
a maximum aggregate network utility. Furthermore, Table 4 indicates there exists a positive 
correlation with  . 
Table 4 The subsidy of ports under maximum aggregate network utility  
Port  =0.008  =0.012 
Dalian Port 100.318 561.553 
Dandong Port 97.145 543.602 
Yingkou Port 96.013 536.882 
Panjin Port 97.794 547.717 
Jinzhou Port 98.060 549.145 
Huludao Port 86.991 485.835 
(2) The identification and ranking of key nodes in PHSN. Due to the substantial amount of 
data, we only display the first 20 data, and the specific results are presented. Several 
conclusions can be drawn from further analysis of the results. (a) The importance of ports, 
nodes in the hinterlands and logistics enterprises to the service network decreases in turn. (b) 
The importance of hinterland nodes in Heilongjiang, Jilin and Liaoning provinces to the 
service network decreases in turn, and each provincial capital’s importance is higher than in 
other cities. This is because of the location of the provinces and ports. From the perspective of 
aggregate network utility, to ensure the stability of the entire services network, the importance 
of the nodes in the hinterlands far from the ports increases correspondingly. (c) Because the 
importance of nodes is not only reflected in their own characteristics, but it also includes its 
network utility, the importance of some edge nodes in the network will increase, such as 
Dandong Port, Harbin and Changchun. (d) The importance of logistics enterprises is 
positively correlated with their position and strength. 
Table 5 The overall ranking of nodes in the PHSN 
Value Node Value Node Value Node 
48.75 Dalian Port -9.85 Dandong Port -15.67 Jixi 
36.93 Yingkou Port -9.86 Daqing -15.79 Qiqihar 
19.38 Panjin Port -10.19 Qitaihe -16.25 Shuangyashan 
10.32 Jinzhou Port -11.63 Yichun -16.81 
Dalian Inland Port Logistics Base 
Co. LTD 
-0.83 Harbin -11.75 Hegang -17.08 Changbaishan 
-3.04 Changchun -13.7 Mudanjiang -17.11 Tonghua 
-9.43 Suihua -13.88 Jilin   
Risk transmission and control of port-hinterland service network: Zhang Pengfei, Han Bing 
from the perspective of preventive investment and government subsidies Kuang Haibo 
73 
 
Table 6 The ranking of nodes in the hinterlands 
Value Node Value Node Value Node 
-0.83 Harbin -13.7 Mudanjiang -17.11 Songyuan 
-3.04 Changchun -13.88 Jilin -18.31 Jiamusi 
-9.43 Suihua -15.67 Jixi -18.63 Heihe 
-9.86 Daqing -15.79 Qiqihar -20.3 Daxinganling 
-10.19 Qitaihe -16.25 Shuangyashan -25.57 Baicheng 
-11.63 Yichun -17.08 Changbaishan -31.33 Siping 
-11.75 Hegang -17.11 Tonghua   
 
Table 7 The ranking of ports 
Value Node Value Node 
48.75 Dalian Port 10.32 Jinzhou Port 
36.93 Yingkou Port -9.85 Dandong Port 
19.38 Panjin Port -34.86 Huludao Port 
 
Table 8 The ranking of logistic enterprises 
Value Node Value Node 
-16.81 PDA -26.57 Dalian Heishan Logistics Co. LTD 
-18.41 COFCO -26.7 Beidahuang Logistics Co. LTD 
-21.33 Dalian Port Jifa Logistics Co. LTD -26.81 
Panjin Liaobin Xincheng Logistics Co. 
LTD 
-23.07 
Yingkou  Chenguang Logistics 
Co. LTD 
-27.01 China Logistics Liaoning Co. LTD 
-23.27 CRCT -27.11 Dalian Container Logistics Co. LTD 
-24.53 Dalian Burton Logistics Co. LTD -27.28 
Dalian International Logistics Park 
Development Co. LTD 
-24.73 JCtrans -27.43 CRT 
-25.14 
Dalian Port Wantong Logistics Co. 
LTD 
-27.67 Panther Logistics Co. LTD 
-25.64 
Yingkou Coastal Industrial 
Logistics Base Co. LTD 
-27.7 
China Silk Liaoning Chemical 
Logistics Co. LTD 
-25.91 
Liaoning Zhongyun Logistics Co. 
LTD 
-27.81 
Dalian Cosco Marine Logistics Co. 
LTD 
 
 (3) The identification and ranking of the key groups in the PHSN. To save the 
calculation time of key groups, this paper uses the size two group as an example. The specific 
results are presented in Table 9. 
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Table 9 The overall ranking of key groups 
Group Value Group Value 
Harbin Railway  
Logistics Co. LTD 




Huludao Port -890.25 
Harbin Railway 
Logistics Co. LTD 












Yingkou Port -806.25 Dalian Port Dandong Port -904.35 
Yingkou Port Panjin Port -869.27 Dalian Port Yingkou Port -906.21 
Yingkou Port Jinzhou Port -872.33 Jiamusi Dalian Port -933.2 
Panjin Port Jinzhou Port -873.07 Suihua Dalian Port -937.8 
Dandong Port Jinzhou Port -885.17 Heihe Dalian Port -939.71 
Dandong Port Panjin Port -886.82 Daqing Dalian Port -942.53 
 
 (4) Comparative analysis of subsidy strategies. Allocating the limited resources to risks 
according to the importance of nodes and groups in the network under the constraints of 
resources, target risks and efficiency greatly improve the efficiency of risk prevention 
investment. We next illustrate the advantages of these two strategies based on the 








=   and is computed in Section 4. We select the top 20 nodes from the 
ranked key nodes. For consistency in comparisons, the top 10 groups from the ranked key 
groups are selected, and the selected key nodes and groups are subsidized in order. 
 Fig. 4, which illustrates the aggregate subsidy utility growth curve, indicates that the 
aggregate utility produced by subsidizing each node among 20 key nodes is higher than that 
among 20 random nodes. In the initial stage, the difference between the aggregate utility 
produced by key nodes and that by random nodes is narrow, but with a sustaining subsidy that 
difference increases due to network complementary utility. Accordingly, the advantage of the 
key node subsidy strategy is evident. 
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Fig. 4 The utility comparison between key nodes and random nodes subsidy strategies 
 
Fig. 5 The utility comparison between key groups and random groups subsidy strategies  
 
The curves in Fig. 5 exhibit characteristics similar to the curves in Fig. 4, i.e., the utility 
difference broadens with the sustaining subsidy. When comparing Fig. 4 and Fig. 5 and 
setting 0.5 as the target, the key nodes subsidy strategy reaches the target after subsidizing 14 
nodes, while the key group subsidy achieves the target only after subsidizing 5 groups, i.e., 10 
nodes. This finding illustrates that key group subsidy has more advantages than the key nodes 
subsidy with respect to efficiency. In addition, the aggregate utility of the key group subsidy 
after subsidizing 10 groups is 2.1, while the utility of the key nodes subsidy is only 1.3, which 
indicates that the complementary utility of the key group subsidy is better than that of the key 
nodes subsidy. Accordingly, it is concluded that the key group subsidy is superior to the key 
nodes subsidy. 
7. Conclusions 
This study analyzes the risk prevention investment strategy and subsidy strategies of a 
port-hinterland service network that consists of ports, carriers, and nodes in the hinterlands. 
Furthermore, the study validates the model through a case analysis that provides a new 
perspective of risk prevention for relevant participants and managers. This study yields 
several conclusions. 
(1) Participants' risk prevention investment strategies are closely related to their Katz-
Bonacich centrality, which increases as the interaction intensity increases and decreases as the 
unit risk prevention investment cost the increases. 
(2) In the equilibrium state, the aggregate risk prevention investment of port-hinterland 
service network increases as the network density increases. 
(3) The optimal risk prevention investment of the participants in the port-hinterland 
service network is positively correlated with the maximum competitive intensity of the 
service network. 
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(4) Homogeneous subsidies for risk prevention investment cannot increase the overall 
network risk prevention utility level. 
(5) In the case of resource and efficiency constraints, without considering the cost of 
acquiring port-hinterland service network information, the key node subsidy strategy is better 
than the random node subsidy strategy, while the key group subsidy strategy has greater 
advantages than the key node subsidy strategy, whose advantages are primarily specific to the 
efficiency and complementary utility. 
From the abovementioned conclusions, several policy implications can be suggested for 
the managers or the government. (1) Improve the cooperation relationships between different 
kinds of agents in the PHSN. Because the optimal risk prevention investment is positively 
correlated with the maximum competitive intensity of a service network, so this policy can 
enhances the risk prevention ability and can obtain the higher risk prevention utility using 
lower amount of investment with the mitigation of competition intensity; (2) Merge the 
service agent with lower risk resistance ability or service capability. This strategy can lower 
the number of service agent and form lots of integrated service agents with higher service 
capability and risk resistance ability, which to some extent improves the risk resistance ability 
and reduces the risk prevention cost. (3) Adopt the differentiated subsidy policy. Making 
targeted risk prevention investment subsidy for different service nodes or service groups by 
recognizing their importance to a PHSN can improve the risk prevention efficiency under the 
resource or time limitation. 
The analyses discussed herein provide risk prevention references for managers of and 
participants in the port-hinterland service network, thus enhancing, to some extent, the risk 
prevention ability of the network. However, some aspects of the study require further 
examination. In a future research, we will extend our model by considering the special 
attributes of the participants, the differences in relations and other perspectives to improve 
feasibility of our findings. In addition, the time dimension of risk prevention is an aspect that 
should be the subject of further study. 
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